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We  construct  a rich  dataset  covering  47 developing  countries  over  the  years  1990–2007,  combining  sev-
eral  micro  and  macro  level  data sources  to  explore  the  link  between  political  factors  and  body  mass  index
(BMI). We  implement  a heteroskedastic  generalized  ordered  logit  model  allowing  for  different  covariate
effects  across  the  BMI  distribution  and  accounting  for the unequal  BMI  dispersion  by  geographical  area.
We  ﬁnd  that  systems  with democratic  qualities  are  more  likely  to  reduce  under-weight,  but  increase
overweight/obesity,  whereas  effective  political  competition  does  entail  double-beneﬁts  in  the  form  of
reducing  both  under-weight  and  obesity.  Our  results  are  robust  to the  introduction  of  country  ﬁxed
effects.
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. Introduction
The bulk of the public health and economic research on devel-
ping countries traditionally focused on communicable, maternal,
erinatal, and nutritional conditions (Behrman et al., 2009), with
nder-nutrition generally considered to be the most important
utritional challenge in low- and middle-income countries. How-
ver, it has recently been acknowledged that the “obesity epidemic”
as increasingly spread in developing countries (Monteiro et al.,
004; Popkin, 2001, 2008), while under-nutrition still continues
o prevail, producing a “double burden of malnutrition” (Lukito
nd Wahlqvist, 2006; Prentice, 2006). Inspired by Besley and
udamatsu’s (2006) work on political factors and mortality rates,
e investigate the effect of political factors on body mass indexBMI),1 a measure of the human body shape often used as a proxy
or adiposity. To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst paper that exa-
ines the effect of political factors on the BMI  distribution using
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +41 21 692 33 92.
E-mail address: elena.fumagalli@unil.ch (E. Fumagalli).
1 BMI is deﬁned as weight(in kg).
height(in metres)2
.
053-5357 © 2013 Elsevier Inc. 
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2013.06.002
Open access under CC BY license.a rich micro-level dataset, controlling for a range of confounding
factors and covering a large number of developing countries.
We construct a dataset of 47 developing countries from 1990
to 2007, containing individual socio-economic characteristics col-
lected in the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS), as well as
demographic and country speciﬁc information from different data
sources. We  use a categorical version of the BMI variable (i.e. under-
weight, normal weight, overweight or obese), and analyze the
entire BMI  distribution not restricting our analysis to obese (e.g.
Maennig et al., 2008) or underweight (e.g. Milman et al., 2005)
individuals. By studying the top, middle and bottom parts of the
distribution we are uniquely able to assess whether political factors
affect over- and underweight in different ways.
Since several of the countries in our sample are facing a dou-
ble burden of both over- and under-weight (especially in Asia and
Africa – see Fig. 1), we exploit an econometric speciﬁcation which
allows for the identiﬁcation of distinct links between the various
points of the BMI  distribution and the covariates of interest. Further,
given the use of a cross country dataset, we allow for heterogeneity
by geographical areas (i.e. modifying the estimator to ﬁt a het-
eroskedastic speciﬁcation), as the commonly used BMI  deﬁnition
for obesity (i.e., BMI  > 30) might not be an appropriate measure of
E. Fumagalli et al. / The Journal of Socio-Economics 46 (2013) 48– 56 49
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BMI  outcomes, potentially relevant insights may  still be inferred
for the present paper. There are multiple channels through which
political characteristics might in principle affect health. First,Underno
Fig. 1. The prevalence of under- and overweight/o
atness for all ethnic groups (Barba et al., 2004). We  further intro-
uce country and time ﬁxed effects in the estimations to account for
nobserved country speciﬁc factors, time invariant characteristics
nd macro time-speciﬁc shocks.
In short, we ﬁnd that political characteristics are important
n determining BMI  status, even after controlling for relevant
ovariates as well as country ﬁxed effects. In particular, we ﬁnd
hat systems with democratic qualities are more likely to reduce
nder-weight, but increase overweight/obesity, whereas effective
olitical competition does entail double-beneﬁts by reducing both
nder-weight and obesity (increasing the chances of being normal
eight). The heteroskedastic speciﬁcation suggests a signiﬁcant
ifference in the variance of BMI  across geographical areas, with
sian countries showing the lowest variability.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present the
ackground of the research. Section 3 describes the data and Section
 the econometric speciﬁcation. Finally, Sections 5 and 6 contain the
escription of the results and the discussion.
. BackgroundEcological studies have shown that political freedom (Alvaro
t al., 2004; Franco et al., 2004) and democratization (Kudamatsu,
012) are positively associated with different measures of health,d Overweight/Obese
 in 47 countries of the DHS (women, aged 18–49).
e.g. maternal and infant mortality. Similarly, Vollmer and Ziegler
(2009) ﬁnd a positive association between democratization and
human development (measured by literacy and life expectancy),
and Klomp and De Haan (2009) establish a positive relationship
between democracy and a composite individual health index. By
contrast, Young (1990) fails to ﬁnd empirical support for Owens’
hypothesis (Owens, 1987) that populist authoritarian regimes
increase physical quality of life more than “false democracies”2 do.
Besley and Kudamatsu (2006) ﬁnd that the relationship between
life expectancy and democratization is not robust to the inclusion of
country ﬁxed effects, suggesting that political variables might cap-
ture some unobserved country level factors and not just the effect
of democratization itself. Such concerns are reinforced in light of
the fact that – with the exception of Kudamatsu (2012) – all of the
above studies investigate the impact of political characteristics on
health outcomes at the aggregate country level.
While the above-described body of evidence does not focus on2 According to Owens, in false democracies political rights are ensured, while
economic and social ones are not (Owens, 1987).
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Table 1
Aggregate percentages for non-normal BMI  by geographical region.
Underweight BMI  Overweight/Obese BMI
Africa 11.41 17.07
America 4.13 42.11
Middle East 2.01 51.52
Asia 26.40 15.12
Table 2
Sample descriptive statistics.
Mean/proportiona Std. Dev.
Country characteristics
Political situation
Democracy1 0.657 0.460
Executive Competition1 0.628 .462
Development
#  of physician per 1000 people2 0.644 0.767
#of telephones per 1000 people2 46.2 58.3
Financial position
GDP per capita, PPP3 2738.5 2258.9
Annual GDP growth (%)3 0.026 0.034
Imports of goods and services as % of GDP3 34.3 18.3
Nutritional habits
Proportion of fat in diet4 0.182 0.045
Individual characteristics
BMI
Underweight 0.126
Normal 0.596
Overweight 0.186
Obese 0.093
Education
Incomplete primary 0.204
Complete primary/incomplete secondary 0.285
Complete secondary or higher 0.159
Age 30.8 8.95
Living in urban area 0.426
Working 0.501
(WDI), (c) economic and institutional characteristics come from the
Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive (CNTS),4 which provides
annual data for a range of countries from 1815 to the present, and0 E. Fumagalli et al. / The Journa
emocratic governments may  be more efﬁcient (Adam et al.,
011) and political parties with egalitarian ideologies, or propor-
ional systems could provide a greater incentive for designing
ro-poor public health policies, compared to the incentives pro-
ided in autocratic regimes (see Mulligan et al., 2004; Navarro et al.,
006; Wigley and Akkoyunlu-Wigley, 2009). Second, in democratic
egimes candidates compete for voting, and hence the “quality” of
he elected policy-makers and of the health (and other) policies
hey implement might be superior to that in authoritarian countries
Ruger, 2005; Besley and Kudamatsu, 2006). Third, non-autocratic
egimes may  be better placed to translate economic growth into
 higher amount of calories (Blaydes and Kayser, 2011). Compet-
tive elections encourage candidates and incumbent governments
o attract voters with targeted rewards and the most effective vot-
rs to target are the poor, through pro-poor policies that result in
reater amounts of food (which would reduce under-nutrition but
ay  increase obesity).
The above theoretical mechanisms should lead us to expect
hat democracy aids in reducing at least under-nutrition, while the
xpected effect of democracy or other political factors on obesity
n countries that have exceeded a minimum level of food availabil-
ty is ambiguous. To the extent that obesity reﬂects the rational,
ree choice of individuals (Philipson and Posner, 2003), autocratic
egimes that have an interest in their population’s health (of which
here may  not be too many) may, at least in principle, be better
laced to enforce healthier lifestyles through various regulatory
easures (Toh et al., 2002).
Only Besley and Kudamatsu (2006) have explicitly analyzed the
ole of political characteristics in relation to under-nutrition. In the
xplanation of the under-nutrition phenomenon, behavioral fac-
ors are arguably much less important than for obesity, since the
rade-off between the pleasure from (over-)consumption of food
nd maintaining a healthy weight does not apply. Hence, under-
utrition is less likely to be a condition caused by preferences, but
ostly by binding (mainly economic) constraints restricting the
rovision of and access to food. Hence, the role of political factors
ould, in principle, be very relevant. There is considerable evidence
n the fundamental importance of the spatial and environmental
Kandala et al., 2001; Cleah et al., 2010; Khatab, 2010; Lovadino de
ima et al., 2010) as well as the economic determinants (Heltberg,
009) of under-nutrition, while individual characteristics and pre-
erences appear to matter less. Investigating the determinants of
hild stunting, Milman et al. (2005) assessed the importance not
nly of individual characteristics (e.g. food insecurity, insufﬁcient
urchasing power), but also of aggregate types of determinants,
ith the latter ones (speciﬁcally the change in immunization rate,
afe water availability, energy supply, initial female literacy rate,
nd degree urbanization) estimated to be the most important. It is
orth noting that the signiﬁcance found for the aggregate inﬂu-
nces might, at least partially, be attributable to the lack of control
or ﬁxed effects.
While evidence on the impact of political settings on obe-
ity in developing countries is scarce, important work on the
ore “standard” determinants informs our choice of covariates.
insa et al. (2012) ﬁnd a positive association between socioeco-
omic status (SES) and obesity for both men  and women in low
ncome countries, while for middle income countries the asso-
iation becomes largely mixed for men  and mainly negative for
omen. Further empirical ﬁndings from single country studies
ndicate that childhood deprivation and higher SES signiﬁcantly
ncrease the likelihood of being obese in urban Africa and Malaysia
Case and Menendez, 2009; Tan et al., 2012). Looking at under- and
ver-weight Corsi et al. (2011) for Bangladesh argue that household
nd neighborhood wealth is negatively (positively) related to being
nderweight (overweight), with residence in rural neighborhoods
eing signiﬁcantly associated with decreased levels of overweight.a The mean for binary indicators implies sample proportions.
Data sources: 1 Polity IV, 2 CNTS, 3 WDI, 4 FAOSTAT.
3. Data and variables considered
This study employs a rich set of data (see Tables 1 and 2 for
aggregate descriptive statistics), combining both micro and macro
level information, and covering 47 developing countries for 17
(1991–2007) years, with each country appearing between one and
ﬁve times (Table A1). The individual microdata come from differ-
ent waves of the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS), which are
nationally representative repeated cross-sectional surveys cover-
ing different aspects of health and demographics. The DHS focuses
largely on women  in fertile age, usually 15–45 years old. In almost
all countries height and weight are measured by the interviewer,
hence avoiding reporting bias and allowing for objective BMI  meas-
ures to be derived. We  create a global dataset by arranging all the
countries and years in which such information was  included.
Further, the dataset is enriched by country-level information
from four additional sources: (a) country level political character-
istics are taken from the Polity IV Project database, which covers
all major independent states world-wide,3 (b) economic indicators
are obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators3 Produced by the Center for Systemic Peace. See http://www.systemicpeace.org/
polity/polity4.htm.
4 Distributed by Databanks International.
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18 and 9% are underweight, overweight or obese, respectively. The
mean age is 31 years, with 29% of the respondents reporting com-
plete primary/incomplete secondary education and 16% completedE. Fumagalli et al. / The Journa
d) proxies of nutritional habits (e.g. total average fat intake) are
aken from FAOSTAT, which provides time-series and cross sec-
ional data relating to food and agriculture for some 200 countries
rom 1960.5
Using the WHO  BMI  classiﬁcation, individual BMI  is transformed
nto a categorical measure taking four values: underweight (<18.5),
ormal weight (18.5–24.99), overweight (25.00–29.99) and obese
>30). Table 1 provides average proportions calculated across all
ountries. To correct for racial disparity in BMI  classiﬁcation, we
llow for heteroskedasticity by macro-region (America, Africa, Asia,
iddle East).
Out of our set of explanatory variables, the deﬁnitions of the
olitical variables, which are the primary interest of our study,
arrant further discussion. Since the literature has focused both
n the effect of the type of government and on the way polit-
cal competition takes place, we chose two variables to capture
he political characteristics of a country. Following Persson and
abellini (2004) and Besley and Kudamatsu (2006), democracy is
eﬁned as a dichotomous variable equal to one (=democratic), if
he POLITY2 score is positive, and zero otherwise.6 POLITY2 is a
lightly modiﬁed revision of the POLITY score, which is a “conve-
ient avenue for examining general regime effects in analyses”, and
t measures the “concomitant qualities of democratic and autocratic
uthority in governing institutions” (Marshall et al., 2010, p. 17). In
ddition, following Besley and Kudamatsu (2006), we argue that
ne of the major factors inﬂuencing health (and thus BMI  in our
ase) is the quality of the political competition, which in princi-
le should ensure that the most competent policy makers will be
elected. Therefore, we  include in our analysis the quality of the
xecutive competition. The indicator is based on the EXREC variable
f the Polity IV database, which takes eight values from “Succession
y birthright” to “Formal competition among publicly supported
andidates”. We  dichotomize our measure of executive competi-
ion, and give the value of 1 if EXREC is 6 (“Ascriptive and elective
ulers coexist”) or higher (see also Besley and Kudamatsu, 2006),
hus capturing the cases in which some electoral competition does
xist.
To control for confounding and to isolate the effect of political
haracteristics on BMI, a number of covariates are introduced in
he estimation (see Table 2), both at the individual (i.e. education,
ge and its square, living in an urban area, and working status) and
t the aggregate level. To distinguish the effect of political devel-
pment from the one of economic development, we  also include
easures of the economic wealth of a country (i.e. the level and
rowth rate of per capita GDP), a measure of how “globalized” the
conomy is (i.e. imports of goods and services as % of GDP), the
uality of its services (e.g. number of telephones and physicians per
000 people) and the average quality of the diet (e.g. proportion of
at in diet).
Furthermore, changes in individual BMI  are likely to respond
o country level changes of the past – a feature we account for
y introducing three-year moving averages (including current year
nd with equal weight across all three years) for all country level
ovariates. Therefore country level binary covariates are trans-
ormed into the proportion of, for example, democratic years over
he three years (i.e. the current one plus the past two).
Finally, we restrict our sample to individuals of 18 years old and
ver, to avoid the idiosyncratic patterns exhibited by students and
dolescents. Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics, in terms
f averages across women in all countries and all years, for the
ariables included in the analysis.
5 See http://faostat.fao.org.
6 The adjustments made to the variable by Besley and Kudamatsu (2006) are not
ecessary for our purposes as this study covers a different time-span.cio-Economics 46 (2013) 48– 56 51
4. Econometric model and estimation
Using the ordinal nature of the BMI  variable and assuming BMI  to
be a linear function of the covariates that is logistically distributed,
the ordered response logit models can be written as
Pr(BMIi ≤ j) = (Xiˇ) =
exp(˛j − Xiˇ)
1 + exp(˛j − Xiˇ)
(1)
where j = 1, . . .,  J is the number of BMI  categories (in our
case 4:1 = Underweight, 2 = Normal, 3 = Overweight, 4 = Obese) and
i = 1,. . .,n is the individuals in the sample. The vector Xi indicates the
covariates used in the estimation, while aj are the cut-off points to
be estimated along with the rest of the parameters.
Such speciﬁcation constrains all parameters (apart from the
alphas) to be equal across all BMI  categories. This assumption is
referred to as single crossing property and requires that as one
moves from the probability of the smallest outcome to the prob-
ability of the largest outcome, the marginal probability effects are
allowed to change their sign (effect) once7 (Boes and Winkelmann,
2006). Borrowing from Long and Freese (2005), the ordered
response model is equivalent to j − 1 binary regressions, assum-
ing that the slope coefﬁcient for each covariate is constant across
regressions (i.e. parallel lines assumption).
Relaxation of this assumption can be carried out by making the
cut-off points linear functions of the covariates, and as such intro-
duce heterogeneity in the coefﬁcients (Terza, 1985). Substituting
aij = kj + Xi j in Eq. (1) gives the generalized model,
Pr(BMIi = j|Xi) = (j − Xiˇj) − (j−1 − Xiˇj−1) (2)
where the estimated coefﬁcients are ˇj =  j − ˇ.
A further common assumption of the model is its assumed
homoskedasticity, which we relax by parameterizing the variance
() and making it a function of observable characteristics. As past
literature argues (Barba et al., 2004), the commonly used BMI  deﬁ-
nitions and BMI  cut-offs are not appropriate measures of adiposity
for all ethnic groups and geographical areas, in particular for Asian
countries. To accommodate this, we allow for heteroskedasticity
according to region (i.e. Asia, Africa, America and Middle East) of the
form i = exp(z1 · Asia + z2America + z3MiddleEast), where Africa is
the reference category with i = exp(0) = 1 and the rest of the scales
(i.e. z) are estimated.
In the estimations we  control for country and time ﬁxed effects,
while we also add as covariates the country mean of all individ-
ual characteristics to account for between country heterogeneity
(Mundlak, 1978). Following the estimation, marginal effects8 are
computed in order to be able to compare the magnitude of the
coefﬁcients.
5. Results
5.1. Sample descriptive statistics
Table 2 presents sample descriptive statistics. About 60% of the
individuals included in our sample have a normal BMI, while 13,7 For example, if a variable had positive effect on the probability of underweight,
a  negative on normal and positive again on overweight and decrease, such models
would be unable to detect it.
8 For continuous variable the marginal effect is
ME = f(j−1 − Xiˇj−1)ˇj−1 − f(j − Xiˇj)ˇj , while for discrete ones it is ME  = Pr(BMIi =
j|x¯i, wk = 1) − Pr(BMIi = j|x¯i, wk = 0).
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econdary or higher education, while about 50% of them work and
3% reside in an urban area.
In terms of country characteristics, an average of 2 years (of
he last three) have been spent under democratic regimes, and
bout the same length of time have been spent in regimes with
 competitive executive nominating process. In term of economic
haracteristics, the reported mean three-year moving average GDP
er capita is $2738, with imports of goods and services covering
4% of the GDP. The average proportion of fat in the diet (over three
ears) is at about 18%.
.2. Estimation results
Table 3 gives the signs and magnitudes of the marginal effects of
he various covariates across the four categories of the BMI  distribu-
ion. As for the two political indicators – our independent variables
f primary interest – the effects vary considerably across the BMI
istribution. It appears that individuals in democratic countries
compared to non-democratic ones) are more likely to be over-
eight and obese, i.e. by 2.5 p.p. and 1.5 p.p., respectively, but also
ess likely to be underweight by about 1.5 p.p. By contrast, the qual-
ty of political competition appears to be beneﬁcial for both the
eduction of underweight (by 1.6 p.p.) and of obesity (by 1.5 p.p.).
The other covariates also offer interesting insights: As expected,
ndividuals in countries with higher per capita GDP face a sig-
iﬁcantly reduced risk of being underweight and an increased
robability of being overweight (although the variable is not sta-
istically signiﬁcant for obesity) with a percentage increase in GDP
ncreasing the odds of being overweight by 0.2 p.p., while reducing
nderweight probability by approximately 0.06 p.p. By contrast, a
ercentage increase in annual per capita GDP growth reduces the
robability of being overweight or obese by 0.2 and 0.25, respec-
ively, while it increases the probability for individual normal BMI
y 0.4 p.p. and appears to have no signiﬁcant impact on under-
eight. Finally, looking at an indicator of the level of globalization
nd openness of the economy, devoting an extra 10% of GDP toward
mports of goods and services, will decrease the probability for
ormal BMI  by 1.2 p.p.
The number of physicians, that we include as a proxy of the
uality of the health system and as a proxy of the level of invest-
ent in health, to capture the fact that democracies tend to spend
ore on healthcare (Besley and Kudamatsu, 2006), has no signif-
cant effect on obesity but does increase overweight by 4 p.p. for
very extra physician per 1000 people, while it decreases the prob-
bility for underweight and normal weight by a similar combined
ercentage (i.e. 2.1 p.p. and 1.5 p.p., respectively). On the other
and, the number of telephones per 1000 people, introduced as
 proxy of technological development, has statistically signiﬁcant
ffects: it reduces the probability of being underweight as well
s the probability of being obese while increasing the probabil-
ty of being normal weight. However, the magnitude of the effect
s very small (e.g. there is an about 0.15 p.p. and 0.01 p.p. decrease
n underweight and obesity probability, respectively, for every 10
xtra phones per 1000 people).
All educational levels (compared to no education) tend to
ncrease the likelihood of being overweight or obese and decrease
he likelihood of being underweight and normal weight. Education
eems to have a linear effect, with the absolute effect magnitude
ncreasing in size as we go from lower to higher levels of education.
s expected from the literature on obesity (e.g. Reither et al., 2009)
ge displays a bell-shaped effect, with the probability of overweight
nd obesity initially increasing with age and then decreasing once certain age threshold is reached. The opposite holds for normal-
nd under-weight. Moreover, living in an urban area also tends to
educe (increase) the probability of being underweight (normal and
verweight or obese) by similar amounts. Working women  have acio-Economics 46 (2013) 48– 56
reduced probability of belonging to all categories apart from normal
BMI, which increases by about 2 p.p.
The nutritional pattern, proxied by the (national average) per-
centage of fat in the diet, is signiﬁcantly associated with the
individual probability of being normal or overweight/obese, but
not with underweight: a 10% increase in the percentage of fat in
the diet increases the likelihood of normal BMI  by 7.6 p.p., while it
reduces the probability of being overweight and obese by almost
6 p.p. and 2 p.p., respectively.
Finally, the parameterization of the variance was signiﬁcant,
indicating non-negligible variability in the estimates by geograph-
ical location and underlining the importance of our correction for
heteroskedasticity. As expected, compared to Africa, Asian popula-
tions seem to have signiﬁcantly less variability in the BMI  outcomes,
while the variability is higher than the reference group, when
considering individuals living in American and Middle Eastern
countries.
6. Discussion
Using a global perspective and employing a large dataset cov-
ering 47 developing countries, this paper is the ﬁrst to use such a
rich and extensive dataset to examine the impact of political fac-
tors on nutritional status (proxied by BMI) at the individual level.
With obesity and malnutrition rapidly becoming global problems
affecting the developing world, this paper adds to the general liter-
ature on the role of political characteristics in determining health.
Owing to our ﬂexible econometric speciﬁcation, the links between
the entire distribution of BMI  (i.e. underweight to obese) and the
quality of the government could be examined.
Even after controlling for a large set of individual and country
speciﬁc covariates and country ﬁxed effects, our analysis shows
that political factors at the country level do explain a signiﬁcant
part of the variation in the BMI  status. The inﬂuence of the “qual-
ity” of the political system (i.e. our executive competition variable)
in a country conﬁrms the idea that it may  not only be the type
of government that determines health, but also the way  politi-
cal competition works. Our ﬁndings are in line with the broadly
related literature suggesting that democratic countries seem to
be able to increase the amount of calories consumed, as argued
by Blaydes and Kayser (2011), thus shifting the whole BMI  distri-
bution to the right. The effect of such a shift is the reduction of
the burden of under-nutrition and the increase of the percentage
of people who  are both overweight and obese. Such decrease in
under-weight is also in line with the Besley and Kudamatsu (2006)
theory and with the empirical results of Smith and Haddad (1999)
who ﬁnd that a unitary increase in democracy (on a 1–7 scale)
leads to a drop in the prevalence of child under-nutrition by about
0.8–1.3 p.p. in developing countries. At the same time, however,
our results do qualify the ﬁnding from previous literature of the
alleged general health improving effects of democracy (Besley and
Kudamatsu, 2006). Klomp and De Haan (2009) showed, for instance,
that a 1% increase in democracy improved the health of individuals
(measured as generic health) by 0.13%. According to our results,
however, democracy may  be good for many health aspects, but it
may  also have adverse effect in the form promoting obesity. It might
be the case that democratic low- and middle-income countries, as
deﬁned in our variable, are more similar to the western democ-
racies, where a nutritional culture based on the consumption of
energy dense food and the diffusion of fast foods have become very
popular in the recent years.By contrast, our results regarding the variable measuring the
efﬁciency and freedom in the choice of politicians and policy
makers support the idea that competition between politicians ulti-
mately promotes the implementation of better (health) policies, at
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Table 3
Marginal effects (computed at the mean) for the generalized heteroskedastic ordered logit estimation.
Underweight Normal Overweight Obese
Country characteristics
Political situation
Democracy −0.0147*** −0.0260** 0.0251*** 0.0155***
(0.00460) (0.0110) (0.00968) (0.00494)
Executive Competition −0.0161*** 0.0285** 0.00277 −0.0152***
(0.00561) (0.0118) (0.0101) (0.00486)
Development
#  of telephones per 1000 people −0.000153** 0.000260** −9.36e−06 −9.77e−05***
(6.71e−05) (0.000104) (8.09e−05) (3.32e−05)
#  of physician per 1000 people −0.0206*** −0.0150* 0.0383*** −0.00262
(0.00648) (0.00908) (0.00671) (0.00280)
Financial position
Country log(GDP) −0.0578*** −0.148*** 0.195*** 0.0103
(0.00734) (0.0190) (0.0172) (0.00865)
Annual GDP growth (%) 0.00601 0.439*** −0.200*** −0.245***
(0.0274) (0.0646) (0.0561) (0.0260)
Imports of goods and services as % of GDP 0.000188* −0.00115*** 0.000633** 0.000327***
(0.000101) (0.000276) (0.000247) (0.000125)
Nutritional habits
Proportion of fat in diet 0.0401 0.751*** −0.599*** −0.192***
(0.0641) (0.159) (0.141) (0.0704)
Individual characteristics
Education
Incomplete primary −0.0207*** −0.0574*** 0.0591*** 0.0190***
(0.000754) (0.00181) (0.00160) (0.000674)
Complete primary/incomplete secondary −0.0312*** −0.0974*** 0.0969*** 0.0317***
(0.000612) (0.00176) (0.00155) (0.000691)
Complete secondary or higher −0.0394*** −0.0851*** 0.102*** 0.0228***
(0.000738) (0.00243) (0.00209) (0.000785)
Age  −0.00551*** −0.0346*** 0.0273*** 0.0128***
(0.000199) (0.000587) (0.000522) (0.000216)
Age  square 6.55e−05*** 0.000355*** −0.000287*** −0.000134***
(3.08e−06) (8.65e−06) (7.74e−06) (3.21e−06)
Living  in urban area −0.0209*** −0.115*** 0.0973*** 0.0384***
(0.000468) (0.00151) (0.00129) (0.000605)
Working −0.00197*** 0.0206*** −0.0114*** −0.00723***
(0.000481) (0.00129) (0.00117) (0.000495)
Observations 644,378
Standard errors computed by the Delta method in parentheses.
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** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
east as far as the health proxies considered here are concerned. We
peciﬁcally ﬁnd that improvements in the quality of the political
ompetition are beneﬁcial in curtailing the tails of the BMI  distri-
ution. Countries whose electoral mechanisms work effectively are
haracterized by a lower prevalence of both malnutrition and obe-
ity. Our estimated drop in obesity by 1.5 percentage points is close
n magnitude to the effect obtained by Yoon and Brown (2011) who
ooked at social capital and obesity, ﬁnding a twofold increase in
he ratio of employees in voluntary organizations to the total pop-
lation to reduce the likelihood of being obese by between 1.4 and
.3 percentage points. It is worth noting that our measures of politi-
al performance, contrary to Besley and Kudamatsu’s (2006) study,
re not only robust to the introduction of other variables at the
ountry level (e.g. GDP, average level of education), but also to the
ntroduction of country ﬁxed effects.
One basic motivation for our analysis was to ideally identify fac-
ors that either could help tackle both under- and overweight at
he same time, or at least one of them without harming the other.
f this was the case, and if those factors were amenable to policy
ntervention, then this would lead to fairly straightforward policy
mplications, even in countries facing a double burden of under-
nd overweight. Unfortunately, our results suggest that this ideal
cenario is the exception rather than the rule. For a number of fac-
ors we ﬁnd a beneﬁcial effect on one type of malnutrition coupled
ith an adverse effect on the other. This holds for our indicatorof democracy and for other controls such as the level of educa-
tion, urbanization, GDP per capita and the number of physicians
per capita.
The estimated effect for education in terms of decreasing the
probability of being underweight is in line with previous results
(Lovadino de Lima et al., 2010), while the exposure to greater risk
of overweight and obesity in developing countries is also in line
with the public health literature (Monteiro et al., 2004) that found
that at least for the low income countries it is those with higher
education that bear the greatest burden of obesity. In our bigger
sample, we do not, however, conﬁrm the non-linearities detected
in their paper.
The increased probability of being overweight and obese for
people living in urban areas and in more open economies con-
ﬁrms the hypothesis that people more exposed to western culture
are more likely to be obese. This is akin to the idea that globaliza-
tion tends to stimulate an obesogenic environment in developing
countries (Hawkes, 2006), fueled by the increase in the availability
of energy dense food (see e.g. Currie et al., 2010). Moreover, our
ﬁnding that the percentage of fat in total calorie intake decreases
overweight and obesity and increases underweight but leaves
normal BMIs unaffected supports Popkin’s (2008) idea that the
main force that drives obesity is not the diet composition, but
rather the positive balance between calorie intake and consump-
tion.
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Looking at the number of physicians, used as a proxy for health
are quality, we ﬁnd a reduction in the likelihood of underweight
nd an increase for overweight. In some cultures being overweight
oes not carry negative connotations, but is instead seen as a sign
f being wealthy that may  not require immediate medical inter-
ention (Case and Menendez, 2009), in contrast to underweight.
owever, caution is suggested in interpreting this particular ﬁnd-
ng, since health care quality is a multi-dimensional characteristic
f the health system that may  not be easily captured by a single
ndicator (Murray and Evans, 2003).
Interestingly, the rate of economic growth, controlling for the
evel of per capita GDP, and labor force participation improve the
ntire BMI  distribution, i.e. shortening the tails. This is in some con-
rast to Ruhm (2000) who showed that for high income countries
ecessions (booms) are associated with improvements (deteri-
rations) in health. The under-weight-reducing effect (though
nsigniﬁcant in our estimates) is more in line with existing evi-
ence, as, for instance, Heltberg (2009), who concludes that
conomic growth decreases stunting, but at a slow pace. The
ffect observed for employment might be an indication that under-
eight, overweight and obese individuals face discrimination (or
ace actual health problems due to their weight) in the labor mar-
et and hence reduce their labor supply (Atella et al., 2008 and
eBeaumont, 2009), which is also supported by the model of
asgupta and Ray (1986, 1987), according to which the malnour-
shed are unemployed, because they lack physical energy but they
eed a high wage to “buy” a sufﬁcient quantity of calories.
A number of limitations for our analysis need to be acknowl-
dged. First of all, even if robust, our results do not necessarily
mply a causal link between political factors and BMI. And even
f causal inference was allowed, it is important to bear in mind
hat the changes in the political system that would be required to
chieve a notable reduction in malnutrition would be quite sub-
tantial (i.e. a shift from a non-democratic to a democratic system,
r from a system with poor political competition to one with a high
evel). Nevertheless, our ﬁndings conﬁrm, strengthen and add some
uance to the correlation found by Besley and Kudamatsu (2006).
Further, due to data constraints, we only employ an aggregateeasure of economic status (GDP per capita), without being able
o include an individual income measure in the analysis. In fact, in
eveloping countries it is very difﬁcult to correctly identify rich and
oor individuals given that wage income fails to capture the truecio-Economics 46 (2013) 48– 56
material wealth of a household, as many households rely on self
production. A more widely used and likely more meaningful mea-
sure of households’ economic wealth is an asset-based wealth index
(Filmer and Pritchett, 2001), constructed using a factor analysis
based on the ownership of a set of assets. We  decided not to include
this indicator for a number of reasons: ﬁrst, it measures relative
wealth, given that by construction it has mean zero and standard
deviation equal to one. Hence, it does not capture increased pur-
chasing power; second, the number and characteristics of the assets
included in the DHS questionnaire tends to vary between waves,
thereby severely compromising comparability between surveys.
Given the high correlation between individual educational level
and income in the developing countries it was decided that edu-
cation could be left to act as a proxy for socio-economic status of
the individuals.
Despite the lack of available data to address such caveats, the
global perspective adopted in this paper and the rich economet-
ric speciﬁcation allow for the study of the effect of political factors
on the full range of the BMI  distribution, while accounting for a
wide range of inﬂuencing factors, country ﬁxed effects and poten-
tial regional heterogeneity of BMI. It constitutes the ﬁrst study of
its kind and prepares the ground for more in-depth exploration of
the issue.
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Table A1
Number of observations by Country and Year.
Country/Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total
BF 0 0 3389 0 0 0 0 0 3290 0 0 0 9332 0 0 0 0 16,011
Bangla  0 0 0 0 0 0 3765 0 0 4343 0 0 0 9819 0 0 9687 27,614
Benin  0 0 0 0 0 2262 0 0 0 0 4745 0 0 0 0 13,064 0 20,071
Bolivia  0 0 0 2283 0 0 0 4117 0 0 0 0 13,919 0 0 0 0 20,319
Brazil  0 0 0 0 0 3071 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3071
CAR  0 0 0 1930 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1930
CDR  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3642 3642
Cambodia  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5903 0 0 0 0 6702 0 0 12,605
Cameroon  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1545 0 0 0 0 0 3902 0 0 0 5447
Chad  0 0 0 0 0 0 3554 0 0 0 0 0 0 2828 0 0 0 6382
Colombia  0 0 0 0 3226 0 0 0 0 3152 0 0 0 0 29,809 0 0 36,187
Cote  0 0 0 2978 0 0 0 0 2274 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5252
Dominican  2095 0 0 0 0 6396 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8491
Egypt  0 4808 0 0 6695 0 0 0 0 13,860 0 0 8133 0 17,179 0 0 50,675
Ethiopia  0 0 0 0 0 0 5233 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5233
Gabon  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2301 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2301
Ghana  0 0 1752 0 0 0 0 2033 0 0 0 0 4288 0 0 0 0 8073
Guatemala  0 0 0 0 4833 0 0 0 2304 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7137
Guinea  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3188 0 0 0 0 0 3068 0 0 6256
Haiti  0 0 0 1837 0 0 0 0 0 7774 0 0 0 0 0 4104 0 13,715
Honduras  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15,223 0 15,223
India  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 99,777 0 99,777
Jordan  0 0 0 0 0 0 3062 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4489 7551
Kazakhstan  0 0 0 0 3119 0 0 0 1990 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5109
Kenya  0 0 3284 0 0 0 0 3215 0 0 0 0 6198 0 0 0 0 12,697
Kyrgyzstan  0 0 0 0 0 0 3115 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3115
Lesotho  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2686 0 0 0 2686
Liberia  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5362 5362
Madagascar  0 0 0 0 0 0 2504 0 0 0 0 0 0 6344 0 0 0 8848
Malawi  0 2263 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9943 0 0 0 8530 0 0 0 20,736
Mali  0 0 0 0 0 4086 0 0 0 0 9196 0 0 0 0 10,594 0 23,876
Morocco  0 2851 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13,862 0 0 0 0 16,713
Mozambique  0 0 0 0 0 0 3095 0 0 0 0 0 9209 0 0 0 0 12,304
Namibia  0 2195 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7588 9783
Nepal  0 0 0 0 3323 0 0 0 0 7658 0 0 0 0 0 8669 0 19,650
Nicaragua  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10,237 0 0 10,138 0 0 0 0 0 0 20,375
Niger  0 3191 0 0 0 0 0 3225 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6416
Nigeria  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1926 0 0 0 5614 0 0 0 0 7540
Peru  5106 0 0 0 0 10,605 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15,711
Rwanda  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7558 0 0 0 0 4367 0 0 11,925
Senegal  0 0 2842 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3413 0 0 6255
Swaziland  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3822 0 3822
Tanzania  4397 0 0 0 0 3734 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7835 0 0 0 15,966
Togo  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3257 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3257
Turkey  0 0 2393 0 0 0 0 2302 0 0 0 0 0 3010 0 0 0 7705
Uzbekistan  0 0 0 0 0 3488 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3488
Zambia  0 3168 0 0 0 3783 0 0 0 0 0 5781 0 0 0 0 5344 18,076
Total  11,598 18,476 13,660 9028 21,196 37,425 24,328 29,931 14,972 62,492 24,079 5781 70,555 44,954 64,538 155,253 36,112 644,378
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